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claimed indebtedness. Apparently the problem still remains as to the
construction of these two statutes where the primary purpose of the
litigation is to obtain a declaration of rights under Chapter 418 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
By the enactment of the amendment to Kentucky Revised Statute
section 21.060 in 1952, the Legislature reduced to a great extent the
number of cases which would appear on the Court of Appeals docket.
There can be no doubt that this was the primary aim of the statute and
a very commendable one. But it is submitted that if the "rights" of in-
dividual litigants in declaratory judgment suits and in injunctive pro-
ceedings, which from their very nature are not susceptible of having
a monetary value placed upon them for purposes of appeal, are to be
sacrificed in order that the court's docket may be lightened, then the
statute should be repealed or amended in order that this situation
may be remedied. If this is not done the court should overrule its
previous decision in the Brashear case and adopt the interpretation of
the statute presented by this note.
WENDELL SAx=r WMtaLvs
[Editor's note-After this note had completed the editorial process, the Court
of Appeals decided McLean v. Thurman, 273 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky., Dec. 17, 1954).
The court held that the Legislature, in amending the statute, did not intend to
deny appeals in those actions in which the amount or thing in controversy is not
translatable into a monetary valuation. The court expressly overruled the case of
Brashear v. Payne, in so far as it conflicted with the McLean decision.]
SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The purpose of this note is to examine two of the three basic
problems arising under the Fourth Amendment, namely: (1) com-
pulsory production of materials to be used solely as evidence; and (2)
the extent to which a search and seizure can be made without a war-
rant. A third problem which often arises concerns the extent of a
search and seizure as incidental to a valid arrest. This latter problem
will not be covered in this note.
(1) Compulsory Production of Materials To Be Used Solely As
Evidence.
The first important case in which the Supreme Court had occasion
to interpret the Fourth Amendment was Boyd v. United States.' This
was not technically a search and seizure case but the Court, neverthe-
less, applied the Fourth Amendment. To provide a more effective
1116 U. S. 616 (1885).
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means of enforcing the Revenue Acts, Congress provided in 1874, by
appropriate legislation, that in any proceeding, other than a criminal
proceeding, arising under the revenue laws, the Court could, in its dis-
cretion on motion by the Government, issue an order to a defendant or
claimant to produce his books, invoices, and papers which might tend
to prove any'allegation made by the United States Government. This
legislation provided further, that if the papers were produced, they
could be used as evidence; if they were not produced, the allegations
of the District Attorney in making the motion for the court order
would be taken as confessed. The Boyd Case arose on an information
in rem, filed by a U. S. District Attorney, in a case of seizure and
forfeiture of property, against 85 cases of plate glass seized by the
Collector of Revenue as having been imported in fraud of the revenue
laws. The defendant, on order from the court, produced a certain in-
voice of an earlier shipment of plate glass-which invoice was desired
to be used solely as evidence in the case-but he objected to the validity
of the order challenging the law under which it was made as being
contrary to the Fourth Amendment, as well as to the Fifth, which, among
other things, protects a person against self-incrimination. The lower
court permitted the evidence to be used and a judgment of forfeiture
was given. The Supreme Court in an unanimous opinion reversed the
decision and declared the law unconstitutional.
Justice Bradley, who wrote the opinion, considered first the prob-
lem of whether this was a "search and seizure". To the Government's
argument that the mere ordering that the papers be produced under
the Act was not the same as a search and seizure, he pointed out the
fact that failure to produce the papers would result in the allegations
of the Government being taken as confessed and concluded:
a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish
a criminal charge against him or to forfeit his property is within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in
which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material in-
gredient and effects the sole object and purpose of search and
seizure.2
The question remained whether this was an unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. It was contended by the
counsel for the Government that the compulsory production of papers
was a legitimate proceeding sanctioned by long usage and the au-
thority of judicial decision. After a historical review, in order to as-
certain what proceedings were meant to be included in the Fourth
Amendment as "unreasonable searches and seizures," Justice Bradley
concluded:
2 Id. at 622.
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. . . any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or
compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict
him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles
of a free American government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an
Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may
suit the purposes of a despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure
atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.
3
As to the question of the Fifth Amendment, Justice Bradley, after
finding that this case of forfeiture was equivalent to a criminal pro-
ceeding, said that the proceeding was within the spirit of both amend-
ments and added:
... the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an
'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure
of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against
him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself.4
Thus it became settled by this decision that the compulsory produc-
tion of one's private papers to be used solely as evidence in a criminal
case is within the prohibition of both the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments.
But this protection is not as broad as one might think at first blush.
The reasoning applied in the Boyd case to a private person does not
carry over as a practical matter into a case where corporate papers are
sought to be produced. Although a corporation is within the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment,5 it is not similarly within the protec-
tion of the Fifth so as to protect an individual officer of the corporation
when incriminating papers of the corporation are sought to be pro-
duced.6 The question often arises as to just what are corporate, as
distinguished from individual, papers. The position of the Court was
clearly stated in the recent case of United States v. White.7
3 Id. at 631, 632.
'Id. at 633.
'That a corporation is within the protection of the Fourth Amendment is
settled by Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). The
lower court in this case issued a subpoena for the production of evidence which
subpoena was based on knowledge secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The court, in reversing the conviction, held that the rule in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) in which it was held that evidence obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not
be used in a subsequent trial to obtain a conviction, could not be evaded by tak-
ing two steps instead of one.
'Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923).
7322 U. S. 694 (1944).
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In this case, during the course of a grand jury investigation into
alleged irregularities in the construction of a Naval Supply Depot, the
district court issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers to produce some of its records.
The respondent, an assistant supervisor, appeared and declined to
produce the demanded documents "upon the ground that they might
tend to incriminate the Union, myself as an officer thereof, or in-
dividually." To sustain his position he relied on the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. He was cited for contempt, the court holding his re-
fusal inexcusable, and was sentenced to thirty days in jail.
The Supreme Court in upholding the conviction held that neither
the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendment was applicable in this case, be-
cause the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was es-
sentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals and hence
could not be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a
corporation. The Court said that basically the power to compel the
production of the records of any organization, whether it be incorpo-
rated or not, arises out of the inherent and necessary power of the
Government to enforce its laws. The Court, conceding that the dis-
tinction between corporate and individual papers is at times very
fine, laid down the following test:
. . . whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a
particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to em-
body or represent the purely private or personal interests of its con-
stituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only.
If so, the privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of the organization
or its representatives in their official capacity.S
The court concluded that labor unions national or local, incorpo-
rated or unincorporated, are clearly within the scope of this test.
Thus it seems that in cases involving corporations and some other
organizations the Boyd reasoning does not apply. Although the Gov-
ernment cannot, because of the limitations imposed by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, subpoena a person's private papers to be used in
evidence against him, they may often reach the same result largely
by subpoening those of a corporation of which he is a member. The
reason underlying the restriction of this constitutional privilege to
natural individuals acting in their own private capacity is clear. It is
fortunate, however, that the privilege does not extend to corporations
which are not, of course, persons. If the cloak of the privilege were to
be thrown around their impersonal records and documents, effective
enforcement of many federal laws, especially those relating to Inter-
8Id. at 701.
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state Commerce, would be impossible. The fact that the state and
federal governments charter corporations and have visitorial powers
over them also provides another convenient vehicle for justification of
governmental investigation of corporate books and papers.9 The
framers of the Constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-dis-
closure were interested primarily in protecting individual civil liberties
and it is not believed that it should be extended to protect corporate
interests, so as to nullify governmental regulations even if individuals
are at time indirectly affected.
(2) Search and Seizure Without a Warrant.
(A) Automobiles and other highly mobile objects.
The Fourth Amendment has never been interpreted to require that
every valid search and seizure be effected under the authority of a
search warrant. For example, the guaranty of freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary dif-
ferences between the search of a dwelling house or other structure
with regard to which a valid search warrant may readily be obtained
without much danger of removal of the incriminating evidence, and
the search of an automobile, or boat for contraband goods, where it is
not practical to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be obtained. 10 A rule followed by some federal courts, prior to its
repudiation by the Supreme Court, permitted an indiscriminate search
of automobiles on the highway for contraband, whether or not there
was probable cause for the belief that contraband was being carried.."
Such decisions permitted the finding of contraband in the vehicle to
justify the search. This doctrine has, however, been repudiated, and
the Supreme Court, while recognizing the peculiar situations involved
in the search of a vehicle on a highway, makes the test of legality of
such a search without a search warrant depend upon a probable cause
for belief by the officer that the automobile is carrying contraband.
12
In Carrol v. United States,13 prohibition agents stopped and
searched the defendant's car on a highway leading from Detroit to
See discussion, Id. at 700.
1047 Am. Jun. 513 (1943).
"United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231 (1922) (Based on the impossibility
of enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment if warrants were necessary for a search
of automobiles); United States v. Fenton, 268 F. 221 (1920) (Where the right
to search was placed on the ground that the illegal transportation of liquor for-
feits it to the government and the possessor has no right to it).
IBrinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Carrol v. United States,
267 U. S. 132 (1925).
"267 U. S. 132 (1925).
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Grand Rapids, Michigan, a leading highway for carrying of contraband
liquor from Canada, and seized a quantity of liquor discovered in the
search. The agents had heard that the defendants were "bootleggers,"
and they had on a previous occasion negotiated with two of them to
purchase some liquor, but delivery was not made. On this particular
night the agents saw a car which they recognized as belonging to the
Carrols, two of the defendants. They followed the car; then stopped
and searched it. The agents had no warrant to arrest the men or to
search the car. The occupants were tried and convicted and appealed
to the Supreme Court on the ground that the evidence was obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and hence, could not be used
against them.
After stating that in many cases, both under the common law and
the constitution, search may be legally made without a warrant the
Court said:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure
without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a be-
lief reasonably arising out of the circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile... contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. 14
It was concluded that "probable cause" furnished the "line of dis-
tinction between legal and illegal seizure of liquor in vehicles", and is
a "reasonable distinction" that "fulfills the guaranty of the Fourth
Amendment."' 5 Probable cause was said to exist, "if the facts and
circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of
prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been com-
mitted..., The court found this situation to have existed and said
that the officers were entitled to use their reasoning facilities as to the
facts of which they had previous knowledge.17
In United States v. Lee,'8 the Court applied the principle formu-
lated in the Carrol case to a boat seized on the high seas. In this case
a Coast Guard boat was patrolling a designated area beyond the
twelve-mile limit when a motor boat was seen. After throwing a
search light on it, and detecting what was thought to be cases of
liquor piled in the bottom, it was brought to port where it was
'lId. at 149.
Id. at 155.
I6 d. at 161.
'To the same effect is Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931). To
show probable cause in order to justify the search of an automobile the Court said,
"it is enough if the apparent facts which come to his attention are sufficient, in
the circumstances to lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
liquor is illegally possessed in the automobile to be searched." See also Dumbra
v. United States, 268 U. S. 435 (1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642 (1878).18274 U. S. 559 (1927).
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searched, the liquor found, and the defendants arrested. The Supreme
Court pointed out that a federal statute authorized the seizure on
the high seas of American vessels subject to forfeiture for violation of
revenue laws and "it is fairly to be inferred that they are likewise
authorized to board and search such vessels when there is probable
cause . .."19 The Court then found that there was probable cause
and held the seizure lawful, relying on the Carrol case. A factor sup-
porting the finding of probable cause in this case is the fact that the
boat, a small one, was beyond the twelve-mile limit. There have been
many other applications of the exceptional rule that an officer can
search an automobile or other mobile object without a warrant upon
probable cause.
20
(B) Determination of probable cause by use of the senses.
An analogous problem is occasioned in cases where officers, by use
of their senses, have a reasonable belief that a crime is being com-
mitted in their presence. This involves the problem whether search
and seizure can be made of a dwelling or other structure without
process in such cases. Many lower Federal courts have held that suf-
ficient probable cause may exist to cause an officer to believe that an
offense is being committed in his "presence," by knowledge gained
through sight,21 hearing,22 smell,23 or a combination of his senses.2
Does this necessarily justify a search without a search warrant? Before
the question was presented to the Supreme Court the answer seemed
to be yes. 25 However, in Taylor v. United States,26 the Supreme Court
seemed to put a different complexion on the problem. Prohibition
agents, after receiving complaints over a period of a year, went to the
defendant's address. Deciding to investigate, they went to a garage
on the premises and, smelling the odor of whiskey coming from within,
they flashed a light inside and saw cardboard cases which they
thought contained liquor. Thereupon they broke in and found 122
cases of whiskey. The defendant subsequently arrived and was ar-
rested. The search and seizure had been undertaken with the hope of
"D Id. at 562.
.Jenkins v. United States, 161 F. 2d 99 (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1947); Medina v.
United States, 158 F. 2d 955 (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1946); Bruner v. United States, 150
F. 2d 865 (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1945).
2Gay v. United States, 8 F. 2d 219 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925).
'Benton v. United States, 28 F. 2d 695 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1928).
Mulrooney v. United States, 46 F. 2d 995 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1981).
Pong Ying v. United States, 66 F. 2d 67 (C.C.A. 8rd Cir. 1933); Felio. V.
United States, 55 F. 2d 161 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1932).
' United States v. Barkowski, 268 F. 408 (1920). See also, McBride v.
United States, 284 F. 416 (1922) in which search of a stable without a warrant
in reliance on smell was upheld.
=286 U. S. 1 (1932).
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securing evidence upon which to indict and convict him. The de-
fendant moved to exclude the evidence on the ground that the search
and seizure made without a warrant was in violation of his constitu-
tional rights. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction emphasizing
that the agents had abundant opportunity to secure a search warrant.
Justice McReynolds concluded:
Prohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact
indicative of possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip the
owner of a building of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches.
27
In Johnson v. United States,28 substantially the same problem was
before the court. Here, narcotic agents having been tipped off by a
reliable source, went to a hotel and smelling burning opium coming
from a room, entered without a search warrant, found opium and then
arrested the defendant. The opium seized was used to secure a con-
viction under the narcotics laws. The, defendant appealed challenging
the search of her home as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court, in reversing the conviction, conceded that "at the time entry
was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magis-
trate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search war-
rant," and said that "no reason is offered for not obtaining a search
warrant except the inconvenience of the officers." The Court then
pointed out that the search was of permanent premises, not of a mov-
able vehicle. In speaking of the Fourth Amendment the Court added:
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
29
This rule that a search warrant must be obtained where it is prac-
ticable was again applied in Trupiano v. United States,30 the Court
stating that "agents must secure and use search warrants whenever
reasonably practicable."31 However, a later decision, United States v.
Rabinowitz,32 cast some doubt as to the proper rule. Although the
question before the Court was one of the extent to which officers might
search a dwelling in connection with a lawful arrest, the court in the
course of its opinion, uttered the following language.
To the extent that Trupiano v. United States .. .requires a search
warrant solely on the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather
'Id. at 6.
33388 U. S. 10 (1948).
2Id. at 14.
34 U. S. 699 (1948).
MId. at 705.
839 U. S. 56 (1950).
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than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest,
that case is overruled. 33
Two recent federal cases34 have seized upon the language in the
Rabinowitz case to reinstate the rule that officers can arrest for crime
committed in their "presence" when appraised by their senses of its
commission, and as incidental to this, make a search for things used
in the crime. This rule cannot be seriously disputed, and is in accord
with the long settled rule that an officer can arrest without a warrant
for a felony committed in his presence. 35
What about the case where officers act on "probable cause" alone,
as on information from a reliable informer, where there is not a crime
committed in their "presence"? It is submitted that in this type of case
a search warrant should be required. The circumstances in such cases
do not justify a search without a warrant. The Court has not, as yet,
gone so far as to hold that a search warrant can be dispensed with in
cases where only "probable cause" exists, although undoubtedly this
is true in cases where officers detect crime being committed in their
presence. This is as it should be. No amount of probable cause to
believe that contraband articles are being kept in a permanent struc-
ture should justify an entrance into it, without consent, or without a
search warrant.
WnxLAm C. BR.TFo D, JRt.
'3 Id. at 66.
"'Johnson v. United States, 199 F. 2d 231 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1952); United
States v. Baxter, 89 F. Supp. 782 (1950).
'See A. L. I. Code Crim. Proc., see. 231 (1930).
